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Abstract
The stagnation of the Italian economy over the last two decades is widely
documented. During this period, the world economy has become highly
integrated, and foreign outsourcing has become a standard practice for firms.
While trade theory predicts benefits from the internationalization of production,
Italy seems to have gained negligibly from it, or, rather to have lost. In a simple
model, we show that this may be the case when markets are overregulated and
competition policies are weak. We study a small open economy with one
oligopolistic and one competitive sector, which outsources part of its production
process abroad. Advances in globalization entail lower tariff rates of outsourcing.
Contrary to the common wisdom, we show that national welfare is an inverted Ushaped function of tariffs. There exists a tariff threshold, below which the
economy loses from globalization because the competitive sector overproduces
and the oligopolistic underproduces (the oligopolistic good has a higher marginal
effect on welfare). Competition policies that target the competitive sector lower
the threshold and allow the economy to benefit from increased openness.
Keywords: Italy’s economic decline, general equilibrium, Cournot oligopoly,
outsourcing
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1. Introduction
In the early nineties, the Italian economy was one of the world’s largest per GDP. This
successful performance was the outcome of a long period of sustained growth, which
had started immediately after the end of WW2 and continued until the late eighties. In
1991, per-capita GDP was above EU average. Starting in that year however, the socalled “Italian «Economic Miracle»” (Nardozzi, 2003) seemed to vanish quickly, and a
long period of stagnation took its place. Italy started to diverge from its major EU
partners and in terms of real per-capita GDP, in 2014 it was back to the levels as of
1997 (IMF, 2015). This long period of internal stagnation almost coincides with a phase
of extraordinarily intense globalization. Like all other developed countries, Italy took
active part in this process, but, contrary to its partners, seemed unable to benefit from it.
The fact that a country may fail to benefit from greater openness comes quite at odds
with the conventional economic wisdom that indeed predicts net benefits from increased
integration. However, this perception is quite widespread among Italian scholars (e.g.
Trento, 2003, Ciocca, 2004, and Accetturo et al., 2013) who believe that Italy failed to
gain from globalization or even lost from it because of a number of structural
weaknesses. The broad consensus around this position, however promptly clashes with
the heterogeneity of ideas around which features of the economy really prevented the
country from taking advantage of globalization. The debate is particularly intricate
because most positions rely on qualitative empirical analysis and deductive reasoning
rather than on quantitative methods. For this reason it is quite difficult to identify clear
causational linkages among the different factors considered and also a hierarchy among
them is not immediately clear. In an attempt to identify the most relevant weaknesses
according to the ongoing debate, a main issue seems to be the generalized low
propensity towards innovation. According to some authors like for example Faini and
Sapir (2005) and Ciocca (2010), this might be a basic reason for the slow pace of
adoption of the new information and communication technologies (ICT) by Italian
firms. Vacciago (2003) and Accetturo et al. (2013) recognize ICT as a crucial factor of
competitiveness for national firms during these decades of intense globalization while
other authors (e.g. Pagano e Schivardi, 2003 and Rossi, 2004) believe the relatively
small size of the average Italian firm to be a major impediment to the slow adoption of
ICT. The scarce R&D efforts seem a valid explanation also for the structure of the
Italian specialization pattern, which a large body of literature (see for example Ciocca,
2004 and D’Ippoliti and Roncaglia, 2011) retains excessively biased towards traditional
and low-tech productions (typically: textile products, apparels, shoes, furniture,
hydraulics and non-metal manufacturing). In this perspective, Italy might have suffered
from globalization mainly because of the involvement of the emerging countries, which
are characterized by similar specialization patterns, and enjoy huge cost advantages
relatively to Italy.
In this chapter, we share the view that Italy might have effectively failed to gain from
globalization, or rather to have suffered from it. However, we focus on another salient
aspect of the economy as a possible explanation for such failure, namely the scarce
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degree of competition on domestic product markets.2 To lend support to this view, we
provide a highly stylized model of a small open economy with Cournot-oligopolistic
markets and foreign outsourcing. We assume two sectors, manufactures and services
and we mimic the higher degree of competition in the goods’ markets relatively to the
service markets by assuming the former to be perfectly competitive and the latter
Cournot-oligopolistic. We approximate the level of economic integration of Italy in the
world economy with an exogenous tariff on intermediates. 3 The economy altogether is
thus subject to two distortions, i.e. the number of oligopolists in the service market and
the tariff on intermediates.
The interaction between these two distortions constitutes a typical second-best
framework (Lipsey and Lancaster, 1956), which allows us to prove that a lower tariff
rate, leading to a more intensive degree of outsourcing is not necessarily beneficial for
the economy if internal markets are (even partly) overregulated. For a given level of
competition in the oligopolistic service market, consumer welfare is an inverted Ushaped function in the level of tariffs and an optimal tariff does exist. When competition
in the oligopolistic sector is scarce, a sufficiently low tariff on intermediates may induce
a welfare loss. Relatively to the oligopolistic sector, the competitive sector
overproduces, and the marginal welfare in this sector is lower than in the competitive.
Similarly, when outsourcing is subject to tariffs, oligopoly and not perfect competition
is the desirable market regime, and an optimal number of firms in the oligopolistic
sector can be determined. A tight market regulation leads to a reduction of production in
the oligopolistic sector and more resources become available for the production of the
competitive good, and this may generate a welfare gain. More importantly, the optimal
number of oligopolitsts is inversely related to the level of tariffs. When economic
integration proceeds, the domestic competition policy should react and become stricter,
otherwise the greater openness translates into aggregate welfare losses. From this
perspective, these findings lend analytical support to the idea that Italy may have
effectively lost from globalization.
The model presented in this chapter belongs to a quite recent line of research on
Cournot oligopoly in general equilibrium, originally initiated by Neary (2003). An
overview of this literature is contained in Zotti and Lucke (2014) who depart from the
one-country-one-factor structure of Crettez and Fagart (2009) to study the welfare
optimality of trade and competition policies in small open oligopolistic economies
(SOOE) with trade in final goods. We extend the small open oligopolistic economy
framework of Zotti and Lucke (2014) to incorporate a rudimental form of trade in
intermediates, which is the prominent feature of the current wave of globalization (see
2

On this point, a large economic literature (e.g. Barca, 1997, Faini, 2003, Faini et al. 2005, Nardozzi,
2004 and Ciocca, 2007, Forni et al., 2010) maintains that markets in Italy were and still are less
competitive than in most OECD countries. Bianco et al. (2012), for example, provide evidence of a
stable or an even growing Lerner index on several final product markets throughout the whole
nineties. The need for more competitive markets is also a primary policy issue (OECD, 2005, CNEL
2007, Christopoulou and Vermeulen 2008) and a major objective of the National Reforms’ Program
by the Italian Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF, 2011).
3
The average tariff for Italy was decreasing in the period 1990-2010 (Accetturo et al., 2013).
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for Italy the study by Breda and Cappariello, 2010). At the same time we maintain the
original static structure of the model in consideration of the substantial lack of growth
over the last two decades in Italy. Moreover, we approximate the relative closedness of
the Italian service sector4 in comparison to the good sector with the assumption that
Italy does not trade services 5. Under the assumption of balanced trade, the economy
imports intermediates and exports manufactures.
The second section of this chapter seeks to provide an overview of the main features of
the Italian economy over the last two decades. Preliminarily, it includes some basic
empirical evidence of the stagnation. The third section describes the structure of the
model of a small open oligopolistic economy (SOOE) with outsourcing, and the fourth
section derives results about globalization and welfare-optimal competition policy. The
fifth section draws some conclusions.

2. Economic stagnation and inability of gaining from globalization
The features of the Italian economy in the last two decades are the object of two
contiguous strands of literature. These are the debate on the reasons for the economic
stagnation and the historical discussion on the structural weaknesses of the economy,
which dates back to the times of the national unification. Most of the literature on the
stagnation considers various aspects of the economy, and uses deductive reasoning
(Rossi, 2004, p. 640) supported by qualitative data observation to provide intuitions
concerning their role in the crisis. Globally, this literature indicates many reasons for the
observed stagnation, and from this perspective, it complements and updates the older
debate on the structural weaknesses of the economy. 6 Altogether, these two strands of
literature are relevant for the debate on Italy’s inability to gain from globalization
because of the comprehensive overview they provide on the alleged weaknesses of the
economy. From a methodological point of view, in fact, this debate is very similar to the
literature on the economic stagnation, as it tries to infer causational linkages between a
given feature of the economy and the missed benefits from globalization.
Based on these nonetheless distinct strains of literature, this section seeks to provide a
broad overview of the main features of the Italian economy, and to highlight which of
them seem to have impeded Italy from gaining from globalization. An overview of
these features is given in Table 1. The table records the main contributions of the
literature on the economic stagnation, and reveals the deep heterogeneity of the debate.
In this overview, we focus on the major weaknesses of the economy and we seek to deal
with them along a unified line of reasoning, which starts from the central role of the
4

Italian trade in manufactures varies around 80%-90% of the trade balance (see Amighini and Chiarlone,
2004 and Accetturo et al., 2013).
5
From the technical point of view of the modeling structure, this assumption does not impinge on the
results.
6
An example of this complementarity is Faini, (2003) who includes the historical north-south divide as an
explanation for the Italian stagnation of the last two decades.
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stagnant TFP and proceeds by searching for its possible determinants. Table 1
complements the overview, as it includes those aspects excluded from this discussion.
We document the Italian economic stagnation by comparing the evolution of the real
per-capita GDP between Italy and other major developed economies. Figure 1 shows
the Italian GDP as a fraction of the GDP of the EU-14 (i.e. the EU prior to the Fifth
Enlargement, excluding Italy) for the period 1951-2008. The process of economic
convergence prescribed by neoclassical growth theory is clearly observable from the
end of WW2 to the beginning of the nineties. Since then, fully completed convergence
turned into lengthy divergence. In order to illustrate the severity of the Italian
stagnation, we present (Figure 2) the overall performance of the economy in terms of
real per-capita GDP growth rates for the period 1951-2008. Note that it is sensible to
analyse the Italian growth performance after studying the international comparison,
since this allows excluding any neoclassical-type convergence process as a major source
of the slowdown.

Figure 1 – Italy’s real per-capita GDP as a fraction of EU-14 average (Source: Own
calculations from Groningen Growth and Development Centre data, www.ggdc.net)
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Figure 2 – Italy’s real per-capita GDP growth rates (Source: Own calculations from
Groningen Growth and Development Centre data, www.ggdc.net)
A basic feature of the Italian stagnation is undoubtedly a poor TFP dynamics. This is
widely recognized by numerous studies which use different methods to show the
unambiguous role of the stagnant TFP in the slowdown of the labor productivity. Faini
(2003) and Ciocca (2004) study the data on capital accumulation and conclude that this
remained substantially constant in the nineties. Daveri and Jona-Lassinio (2005)
perform a decomposition of labor productivity growth and show that falling labor
productivity and not labor input is the reason for the observed decline in real per-capita
income growth. Noticeably, these results are fully confirmed almost a decade later by
Orsi and Turino (2014) who apply the business cycle accounting procedure by Chari et
al. (2007) and show that the labor input actually improved considerably starting in the
mid-nineties.7
Table 1 – Features and weaknesses of the Italian economy according to the relevant
literature on the stagnation
Is this feature a major
weakness
of
the
Italian economy?
Labor
productivity
slowdown
TFP slowdown
Decline in the labor
input
7

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

[6]

[7]

[8]

[9]

[10]

0

Y

Y

0

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

0

Y

Y

0

Y

Y

Y

Y

0

Y

0

N

0

Y

N

0

0

0

0

0

Further studies with similar results are Daveri (2002), Brandolini and Cipollone (2003) and Daveri
(2004), Jorgenson (2005) and Fachin and Gavosto (2010).
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Insufficient
R&D
N
0
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
0
Y
activity
Slowdown in capital
0
N
0
0
N
N
0
0
Y
0
accumulation
Delay
in
ICT
Y
0
Y
0
Y
Y
0
0
0
Y
incorporation
Tax evasion
0
0
Y
0
0
0
0
Y
0
0
Corruption
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Y
Inadequate
0
N
Y
0
Y
Y
Y
0
Y
0
specialization pattern
Low endowment of
0
Y
Y
Y
N
0
Y
0
0
0
human capital
Lack of competition
0
Y
0
0
Y
Y
0
Y
0
Y
on markets
Labor
market
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
N
rigidities
Labor costs
0
0
0
0
0
N
0
N
0
N
Labor market reforms
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Y
Y
0
Poorly
functioning
0
0
0
0
N
0
0
0
0
Y
financial markets
Public debt burden
0
0
0
Y
Y
0
0
Y
0
0
Stock and quality of
physical
0
0
0
Y
Y
0
0
Y
0
Y
infrastructure
Stock and quality
0
0
0
Y
Y
0
0
Y
0
0
material infrastructure
Insufficient
firms’
N
0
Y
Y
Y
Y
0
Y
0
Y
size
Biased
income
0
0
0
0
Y
0
0
0
Y
0
redistribution
Aggregate
demand
0
0
0
0
0
N
0
0
Y
0
weakness
Italy’s North-South
0
Y
0
N
Y
0
0
0
0
0
divide
Inflation
0
0
0
0
N
0
0
0
Y
0
Authors: [1]: Vaciago (2003); [2]: Faini, R. (2003); [3]: Trento, S. (2003); [4]: Toniolo (2004);
[5]: Ciocca (2004); [6]: Rossi (2004); [7]: Faini and Sapir. (2005); [8]: Ciocca (2010);
[9]: D’Ippoliti and Roncaglia (2011); [10]: Accetturo et al. (2013).
Abbreviations: Y = yes; N = no; 0 = irrelevant

There are two main explanations for the poor TFP dynamics, which are both taken from
the literature on the sources of the EU-US productivity divide since the mid-nineties.
These are the labor market reforms of the nineties (e.g. Blanchard and Landier, 2002
and Dew-Becker and Gordon 2012) and the insufficiency of investments in R&D and
ICT (e.g. van Ark et al. 2008). In the case of Italy, there is in fact robust evidence both
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for the trade-off between employment and productivity8 and for the direct effect of the
insufficient level of R&D on the TFP (e.g. Parisi et al., 2006 and Fachin and Gavosto,
2010). The level of R&D expenditures as a share of GDP has been constantly below the
EU-average (OECD, 2006 and OECD, 2012) with R&D intensity in the private sector
far lower than in the other EU countries. During the nineties, in particular, the business
R&D efforts in the nineties showed a net drop in comparison to the previous decade.
According to Venturini (2004), also the pace of investment in ICT followed a similar
path in Italy9. Bassanetti et al. (2004) perform a growth accounting exercise aimed at
measuring ICT contribution to growth, and their results show a negligible impact of ICT
on the TFP dynamics. The slow adoption of ICT by Italian firms is one of the factors
hampering Italy’s exploitation of the opportunities offered by globalization according to
a conspicuous body of literature (e.g. Vacciago, 2003, Rossi, 2004, Ciocca, 2004 and
more recently, Accetturo et al., 2013).
The inadequate intensity of business R&D and the delayed adoption of ICT have
motivated an extensive literature aiming at exploring their main determinants. Two
explanations for this generalized inertia towards innovation are worth mentioning here.
One position that enjoys a broad consensus in the debate (e.g. Trento, 2003, Toniolo,
2004, Rossi, 2004), points to the average size of the Italian firm, which international
comparison reveals to be smaller than in other major partners. According to these
authors, there exists a dimensional threshold, below which a single firm faces serious
constraints in engaging successful research activities, or even in adopting (relatively)
costly modern technologies10. Regarding the latter measure, several authors (e.g. Faini
and Sapir, 2005) consider the simple scarcity of human capital in a company as a major
obstacle for the adoption of the modern ICT. A second explanation focuses on the
pattern of specialization of the economy, which is the object of a huge body of literature
starting in the sixties11 and provides empirical evidence that Italy has a comparative
advantage in traditional (low-tech) sectors. According to this view, these sectors have an
intrinsically low propensity to innovate.
From the perspective of the literature on the effects of globalization on Italy, the biased
structure of the economy provides a sensible explanation for the negative consequences
from increased integration. Italy in fact may have suffered from globalization because
its competitiveness has been challenged by the emergence of the developing countries in
the international arena12. Among the first to believe that the specialization pattern has
8

Papers that, with different approaches, confirm the employment-productivity trade-off for Italy are Boeri
and Garibaldi (2007), Lucidi and Kleinkrecht (2010), Lucidi (2012), Jona-Lasinio and Vallanti (2011)
and, more recently, Orsi and Turino (2014).
9
Pilat et al. (2002) however distinguish between “fast-adopters” (UK, Netherlands, Sweden and Finland)
and “laggards” (Italy and Spain and, to some extent, Germany and France).
10
The debate on the reasons for the inadequately small size of Italian firms is very wide. Some insights
can be found foremost in Onida (2004) and in Trento (2003) as well as in Ciocca (2004) and
Accetturo et al. (2013).
11
For a review of this literature, see for example, Amighini and Chiarlone, (2004) and Federico and Wolf
(2012) for a more historical perspective.
12
Against this view, Fortis and Curzio (2003) believe that the main threat for the Italian manufacturing is
due to the “asymmetric” (i.e. unfair and illegal) competition by China.
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become “inadequate” are Onida (1999) and Trento (2003). Faini and Sapir (2005)
support this view by calculating the Balassa index of Revealed Comparative Advantage
(Balassa, 1965) for Italy and by studying its evolution through time. The size of the
literature studying the Italian specialization pattern contrasts however with the tiny
number of papers searching for the reasons behind it. The explanations provided are a
general scarcity of human capital (e.g. Faini, 2003, Faini and Sapir, 2005, Boeri et al.
2005), and, again the insufficient average size of Italian firms. Several authors (e.g.
Trento, 2003, Onida, 2004 and Ciocca, 2004) argue in fact that a change in the
specialization pattern is generally less probable for smaller firms. An even greater
shortcoming of this literature however, seems to be the inability to demonstrate any
causation between the proven biases in the specialization pattern and Italy’s difficulties
on world markets during this wave of globalization. We are not aware in fact of any
paper proving this causation through quantitative methods.
The two explanations for the low propensity to innovate are seriously challenged by
Sterlacchini and Venturini (2014) and, from a quite different perspective, by Ciocca
(2010). The former authors estimate the long-term elasticity of TFP with respect to the
level of R&D (measured as the share of R&D expenditures on value added) for a set of
five OECD countries including Italy. In the case of Spain, which shares a similar
industrial structure with Italy both for firms’ size and specialization pattern, the
estimated elasticity is 0.19 while for Italy it amounts to 0.08 - 0.12 (with France at 0.19
- 0.21). Noticeably, the authors observe that “in the typical research-intensive industries,
Italian firms devote to R&D half of the share of value added invested in the most
industrialized countries” (Sterlacchini and Venturini, 2014, p. 193). The authors
propose indeed a different explanation for the insufficient R&D investments, which
points to the general tightness of financial constraints at firm level. In their view, these
are a direct consequence of the structure of the Italian banking system (in this vein see
also Accetturo et al. 2013).
Ciocca (2010) suggests that firms quickly lost their propensity to innovate following a
series of policies, which deeply changed the domestic business environment. On foreign
markets, the competitiveness of Italian firms was inflated by the undervaluation of the
lira, which started with the strong depreciation in the early nineties (Italy abandoned the
European Exchange Rate Mechanism as of September 1992) and persisted until 2002.
Internally, generous public spending, wage moderation (which started with the July1993 Tripartite agreement among government, business organizations and trade unions)
and a deliberately weak competition policy gave a major contribution to soaring
company profits. Widespread and rapidly rising tax evasion further explains the
weakened propensity of firms to engage in innovation.

3. The model
We denote the two sectors of the economy by X and Y, where the former is competitive
and the latter oligopolistic. Production of X requires value added, which is produced
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using labor L and capital K, and a foreign intermediate O. The use of input O reflects
the delocalization choice of domestic firms. The tariff rate on imported intermediates is
equal to a percentage  of their price. For simplicity, tariffs take the form of a monetary
transfer to consumers. Production of Y requires only labor and capital, which are
available in fixed supply at L and K . Primary production factors are fully mobile
between sectors, but immobile internationally. The model is static, so that investment is
zero. Hence, domestic demand includes solely final consumption. In the case of X, it is
necessary to distinguish between domestic supply X S and demand X D , where the
surplus is exported and export proceeds are used to finance imports O , i.e. foreign trade
is always balanced.
Households
The economy is populated by L homogeneous private agents. Their preferences are
described by a standard Cobb-Douglas utility function:
U  X , Y   X   Y 1 ,

0   1

(1)

Agents are endowed with one unit of labor each, which they supply inelastically at the
nominal wage W. In addition, they lend private nominal wealth PK K at the rental rate r
to firms, which use the physical capital stock K for production. Private agents are price
takers in both factor markets. Monetary private income, I, consists of primary factor
income, tariffs and profits in the oligopolistic sector:
I  W  L  rPK  K  E   PO  O  Y

(2)

Here E is the nominal exchange rate, PO is the world price of the imported intermediate
O and  are the monetary profits of the oligopolistic sector Y. Utility (1) is
maximized under the following budget constraint:
Y

PX  X  PY  Y  I

(3)

where PX is the world market price of commodity X and PY the price of commodity Y.
Both prices are expressed in home currency. Utility maximizing quantities are

X  

I
PX

Y  1    

(4)

I
PY

(5)

Note that demand (5) excludes monopoly in sector Y, i.e. N  1 , because price elasticity
is one.
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Firms
Firms in sector X employ value added V and intermediate O according to a CobbDouglas technology with constant returns to scale:

X S  AX  V  O1
where V  AV  K V 



L 

V 1

. The optimal quantity of value added is

XS
V X
A


with PV , x

(6)

1

  1    PO 


1   PV , x 

(7)

1

1  rP   W 
 V K 

A    1 

, while the optimal intermediate demand is


X S 1   PV , x 
O X 

A   1    PO 

(8)

where the assumption   0 is sufficient for a positive demand.
In sector Y, output is produced using only value added with a Cobb-Douglas technology
where total factor productivity is AY and the capital production elasticity is  . Within
each sector, firms are completely homogeneous. Sector X is perfectly competitive and
many atomistic firms produce and sell their output at world prices. In sector Y only few
and relatively large business units are active, which operate only on domestic markets
and behave strategically as Cournot oligopolists. Despite their non-atomistic dimension,
they remain relatively small with respect to the whole economy, i.e. they do not enjoy
monopsony power. As argued by Neary (2003), this is crucial, as only through this
assumption are single actors prevented from influencing macroeconomic variables so
that Cournot oligopoly can be modeled rigorously in general equilibrium.
The total number N of oligopolistic firms is exogenous. Since firms are fully identical,
sectoral inputs and output are

K Y  N  KiY ,

i  1,2,

N

(9)

LY  N  LYi ,

i  1,2,

N

(10)

i  1,2,

N

(11)

Y  N  Yi ,

Due to constant returns to scale, cost minimization yields linear cost functions in both
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sectors:

C X  X S   mx  X S

(12)

C Y  Y   my  Y

(13)

1

1  P   1    PO 
where mx  X  V , x  

A     1  
unit costs in each sector.




, and my  PV , y

1 

1  rP K   W 
 Y
 

A     1  

are the

It is straightforward to derive the demand functions for primary production factors:
KV  

KY  

PV , x
V
rP K
PV , y

(14)

Y

(15)

LV  1   

PV , x
V
W

(16)

LY  1   

PV , y

rP K

W

Y

(17)

In sector X, profit maximization requires:
mx  PX

(18)

In sector Y, each oligopolistic firm i maximizes profits taking the behavior of all other
competitors as given:

max
Yi

Yi Yi   PY Y   Yi  my  Yi

(19)

The condition for optimality is:
dPY dY
(20)
 Yi  PY Y   my
dY dYi
Since all oligopolists are equal, condition (20) together with (5) gives the optimal output
quantity at the sectoral level:

Y  1   

N 1 I

N my

(21)
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where N  1 must hold for a positive supply.
Foreign Trade
Foreign trade includes exports of the homogenous commodity X and imports of
intermediate O. Since technology (6) in sector X is Cobb Douglas, imports of O are
essential and could not be zero13. The economy uses exports of sector X to finance the
import of intermediates in the same sector. Tariffs on imports of O are the only form of
foreign trade distortion.
Market clearing conditions and Walras Law
There are two factor markets, and two commodity markets in this economy.
Equilibrium on factor markets requires

KV  K Y  K

(22)

LV  LY  L

(23)

PX   X S  X D   EPO  O

(24)

and
Walras’ Law implies balanced trade

where the difference

X

S

 X D  denotes positive exports by sector X. Moreover, we

keep things simple by assuming that the entire production of Y is sold to domestic
consumers.
Since (24) is redundant, the SOOE is represented by a system of seven independent
equations in eight variables. These are three good quantities, X S , X D , Y , the foreign
intermediate O , the price of the oligopolistic good PY , the factor prices W and rP K , and
the nominal exchange rate E. Two equations describe consumer demand for each good,
two equations represent domestic firms’ supply, two equations are primary inputs’
market clearing conditions, and one equation is the optimal demand for intermediate O.
A unique solution is obtained by choosing the nominal exchange rate to be the
numéraire, i.e. E  1 .

13

Note that the economy may become autarkic if the technology in sector X is generalised to one with
constant elasticity of substitution (CES).
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4. Results
Private utility U can be expressed as a function of the tariff rate  and of the number of
oligopolistic firms N. To see this, insert model solutions for consumption demand (A1)
and (A2) in equation (1), and obtain the indirect utility function as:
1


 N 1

  PV , x       
 N 
U  , N    

1 
N 1
N 1

 

   N      1     1    N    

(25)

where

 :  K   L 


1 



1
 
 AH   
1
1 
Y

1



1


A







1   PX  


and  :        , and

   :

1    1  
1
 
 1


.


(26)

Here, the price of value added in sector X is
1

1 

1
 1   

X


PV . x      A  PX 
1






 PO  

(27)

Note that the condition    , which ensures a positive utility, follows directly from
the assumption of positive tariffs.
We will now use (25) to show that deeper globalization may fail to improve national
welfare, if the economy is oligopolistic. We will show that there exists an optimal level
  of tariffs, below which the economy loses from globalization while the opposite
applies if tariffs are higher than that level.
Proposition 1: Optimal level of economic integration in oligopoly
If N  1 is finite, the optimal level of tariffs   is unique and strictly positive.
Proof: See appendix.
According to Proposition 1, globalization benefits a country only above a certain
threshold of tariffs if the economy is oligopolistic. In stark contrast to standard trade
theory, welfare (measured by private utility) is not a monotonously decreasing function
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of tariffs. Figure 3 reports utility as a function of the tariff rate for the cases N  2
(bold), N  4 (broken), and N  8 dotted14.

Tariff rate
Figure 3 – Private utility as a function of the tariff rate
The intuition for the inverted U-shaped dependence of welfare on the tariff level in the
SOOE model is as follows: Resources are limited and production in one sector has
opportunity costs in terms of output in the other sector. Due to imperfect competition in
the Y-sector, sector Y underproduces and sector X overproduces relative to the efficient
(first best) allocation under perfect competition. Since marginal utility is too low for the
X good and too high for the Y good a reallocation of resources from the overproducing
to the underproducing sector will - other things equal - lead to higher utility.
The same mechanism holds in this case. If tariffs are sufficiently low, imperfect
competition in the oligopolistic sector will result in relatively lower production of Y and
higher production of X than under a hypothetical scenario with zero tariffs and perfect
competition. Hence, if tariffs decrease slightly, imports of the foreign intermediate
increase. Due to balanced trade, exports increase as well. This requires more production
in sector X with higher demand for domestic resources. The price of primary factors
14

The calibration used for Figure 3 and Figure 4 is K  60, L  25, AX  0.8, AV  AY  1,   0.2,

  0.33,   0.4,   0.4, PX  PO  1 .
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increases. Since the price of good X is exogenously fixed, there is a substitution effect
from good Y to good X. This means a welfare decrease. In this setting, the marginal
benefit of lower tariffs is more than offset by the marginal damage of a decrease in
production of Y.
If however tariffs are high, i.e. higher than the threshold, the balance is distorted in the
opposite way, i.e. the ratio of X D to Y is lower than in the efficient allocation. Thus, the
marginal damage of imperfect competition is lower than the marginal damage of high
tariffs. In this case, the economy would gain from lower tariffs.
This effect is also visible in Figure 3. For low levels of the tariff rate, the more firms are
active in sector Y, the higher is welfare. However, if tariffs are high, a higher number of
firms in this sector may lead to an excessive use of resources in this sector and a
decrease in competition would actually increase welfare. Note, for example, that if the
tariff rate amount to 60%, four firms would be welfare-better than eight.
Let us now consider competition policy under the assumption of a given level of tariffs.
For simplicity, we will allow N to be any real number greater than one, i.e. we do not
require N to be an integer15:
Proposition 2: Optimal competition policy under imperfect economic integration
If   0 and finite,   0  the optimal number of firms is unique and finite (infinite).
Proof: See appendix.
According to Proposition 2, perfect competition is not desirable if economic integration
is imperfect and tariffs are positive. Welfare as a function of the number of oligopolists
does not monotonically increase in the number of firms, as standard theory would
suggest. Rather, welfare is inverted U-shaped and there exists an optimal number of
oligopolistic firms 0  N *   . Figure 4 reports welfare as a function of the number of
firms for the cases   0.3 (bold),   0.4 (broken), and   0.5 (dotted).
The optimal number of oligopolistic firms is

N 

1  
 1  
1    

(28)

Clearly, the optimal number of oligopolists is infinite only in the case of perfect
economic integration (zero tariffs).
The non-monotonicity of welfare with respect to N is based on the same intuition as in
the case of Proposition 1. An increase in the number of firms in the oligopoly means a
resource shift towards sector Y. Above the optimal value of N, employed resources and
15

See Beverelli and Mahlstein (2011) for the same assumption.
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produced output become excessive and an inefficiency arises. However, if globalization
improves, the number of firms, which can operate in the oligopolistic sector without
efficiency loss becomes higher. Equation (28) provides evidence for the need of a
stricter competition policy when firms outsource a greater part of their production
because of lower tariffs.

Figure 4 - Private utility as a function of the number of firms

5. Conclusions
This chapter deals with the apparent inability of Italy to gain from globalization. The
debate has identified two major determinants for this failure, namely the generalized
scarce propensity to innovate and the inadequate specialization pattern of the economy.
There is widespread agreement concerning the former that the delayed adoption of ICT
by Italian firms prevented them from exploiting the full spectrum of opportunities
deriving from globalization. At the same time, the historical competitiveness of the
most successful Italian sectors (typically, the low-tech ones) was challenged by the
emergence of the large developing countries. Their similar production structure and
huge cost advantage progressively pushed the formerly successful Italian sectors onto a
declining path, and the whole specialization pattern of the Italian economy became
rapidly inadequate.
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The delayed adoption of ICT and the rapid obsolescence of the specialization pattern are
considered two prominent features of the Italian economy, and indeed the literature on
the stagnation of the last two decades includes them among the plausible determinants
of the crisis. Since the debate on Italy’s inability to gain from globalization focuses on
these features to find possible explanations for the crisis, we briefly review the most
significant explanations in the second section of this chapter. The analysis reveals that
an important weakness of the Italian economy is the scarce degree of competition on the
internal markets and especially on service markets. Consequently, we focus on this
aspect of the economy to propose an alternative explanation for Italy’s failure in gaining
from globalization. We specify a very stylized model of a small open oligopolistic
economy (SOOE) with outsourcing and show that Italy might effectively have suffered
from increased economic integration. The model assumes one oligopolistic and one
competitive sector, which outsources part of its production abroad. We use this setting
to study the welfare effects of globalization in the form of falling tariffs on
intermediates. We show that for a given oligopolistic structure of the economy,
globalization may fail to improve welfare, if tariffs are sufficiently low and competition
is scarce. We also find that perfect competition is not desirable under positive tariffs,
and that an optimal competition policy is necessary. In particular, exogenous advances
in economic integration might require more competition in order to be beneficial for the
economy.
These results are an application of the well-known Lipsey-Lancaster theory of second
best. In general, imperfect competition and tariffs generate underproduction, and a
change in either of the two types of distortion induces a resource shift between sectors
with direct effects on welfare. If the degree of economic integration is extremely low,
there may be underproduction in the protected sector independently of the level of
competition. Thus, lower tariffs can reduce underproduction and improve welfare.
Conversely, if integration reaches high levels, oligopoly is responsible for
underproduction in the non-competitive sector, and advances in integration exacerbate
it.
The model proposed in this chapter rests on several standard but crucial assumptions.
One of them regards the perfectly functioning labor market, which is assumed to clear
autonomously. Clearly, this assumption is in net contrast with the reality of the Italian
economy, and needs to be taken into account when drawing conclusions based on model
results. Under these limitations, this chapter proposes an alternative explanation for
Italy’s failure to gain from globalization over the last two decades, which pivots on the
level of market competition on internal markets, and claims that the costs due to
excessive regulation in some markets may have more than offset the benefits of higher
economic integration.
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Appendix. Proof of propositions
The proof of both propositions is based on utility function (25) and on the model
solutions:





1

   1 
X 
A  K 
L
1
   

D

V



1
 PV , x      
PX
1 

N 1 Y    1  
Y
A  K 
L
N
   


   

(A1)

(A2)

21

where

  , N  :          N  1 N  , and

  N  1 N  . The conditions N  1

  , N  : 1     1        

and   0   (   1  AX 1  a 

1

P

X

PO  )

guarantee positive solutions in the Cobb-Douglas (CES) case.
Proposition 1
We first show that utility (1) is continuous in  for   0 . This is immediately seen
from the fact that   , N  and   , N  are continuous in  and strictly positive since
    0 for any   0 . Hence, X D and Y are also continuous in  . Differentiating
equation (1) with respect to the tariff rate yields
U  1 X D
1 Y 
  D
 1   
 U .
  X 
Y  

(A3)

If  goes to infinity, utility is zero since   , N  and   , N  are finite and X D
collapses to zero (see equation (27)). For   0 0  U  , N   , N  1 . Thus, U  0
if and only if the term in square brackets in equation (A3) is zero. Its opposite is
equivalent to the following cubic equation in the level of tariffs:

 3  a  2  b   c  0

(A4)
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Note first that a  0 , d  0 , and c  0 , which ensure two negative and one positive
solution. (The sign of b is irrelevant.) Let   be the positive solution. In order to prove
that the positive solution is a maximum observe that U  0, N   0 because c  0 and
equation (A4) is the opposite of the term in square brackets in (A3). Since U  , N  is
continuous, and the other roots of equation (A4) are negative, it follows that
U  0, N   0 in 0,   . The fact that   is a root of a cubic equation with at least two
distinct solutions ensures that U  0, N   0 if     . Thus,   is a utility maximum.
This proves Proposition 1.

Proposition 2
We show first that utility function (1) is continuous in N for N  1 . This is
immediately from the fact that   , N  and   , N  are continuous in N and strictly
positive for any N  1 and so are X D and Y . Differentiating the utility equation (25)
and setting U N  , N  equal to zero yields the following quadratic equation in
M :  N  1 N :

A M 2  B  M  C  0

(A5)

with

A :   1        

2

B :   1      1   1        

(A6)

C :  1   1   

Since A  0 and C  0 for all feasible model parameters,

B

2

 4 AC  is strictly

positive. This ensures the existence of two real and distinct solutions, which are
N1,2  1 1  M1,2  ,
discordant
in
sign.
Since
the
negative
solution



M 2   B  B 2  4 AC

 2A

is unfeasible because N  1 must hold. The positive



solution is feasible only if M1   B  B 2  4 AC

 A  B  C   0 . Replace

 2 A  1, which is equivalent to

A, B, C by their definitions and verify that this is a product of

positive terms. Since A  0 and

B

2

 4 AC   0 ,

 A M

2

 B  M  C  is positive
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(negative) for M  M1

 M  M1 

which proves that N1  1 1  M1  is a utility

maximum. Use definitions (A6) and (26) to verify that the optimal N is

N 

1  
 1  
1    

(A7)

Observe that if  becomes zero, N  is infinite. This proves Proposition 2.

24

č

